Tiptoeing Through the Peripheral Minefield: Why Catering to Concepts of Notice is Misguided by Bender, Brian D.
Cybaris®
Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 5
2011
Tiptoeing Through the Peripheral Minefield: Why
Catering to Concepts of Notice is Misguided
Brian D. Bender
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cybaris® by an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Bender, Brian D. (2011) "Tiptoeing Through the Peripheral Minefield: Why Catering to Concepts of Notice is Misguided," Cybaris®:




NOTE: TIPTOEING THROUGH THE PERIPHERAL MINEFIELD: WHY 





I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................75 
A. Why Property Systems Work  .....................................................................75 
B. Policy Justifications of the U.S. Patent System ..........................................77 
II. HISTORY  .........................................................................................................79 
A. Historical Beginning of the Claim in the Patent Document:  
 An Effort to Quantify the Social Costs and  
 Social Benefits of the Patent System ..........................................................79 
  
B. The Patent and Trademark Office..............................................................82 
C. The Courts ..................................................................................................83 
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.  .............................................84 
2. Vitronics Corp., v. Conceptronic, Inc. .................................................85 
3. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.  ........................85 
4. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co.  ....................87 
5. Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v. United States ..........................89 
 
                                                          
† J.D. Candidate 2012, William Mitchell College of Law; M.S. Computer Science, University 
of Minnesota, July 2002; B.A. Computer Science, University of Pennsylvania, May 1999.  The 
author would like to dedicate this article to his wonderful girlfriend Leah and his lovely daughter 
Samantha.  You are the inspiration that keeps me going.  Words cannot describe my gratitude; 
your support has made navigating the complexities of life as a law student and widower possible.  
The author would also like to thank Professor Jay Erstling for his help, dedication, and support 
and the staff of Cybaris
®
 for all of their hard work.  Lastly, the author would like to acknowledge 
his late wife Meredith whose unyielding faith allowed him to take this amazing journey; he would 
not be in this position today if not for her. 
1
Bender: Tiptoeing Through the Peripheral Minefield: Why Catering to Conce
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
[2:73 2011] CYBARIS
®
, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 74 
III. THE PERIPHERAL CLAIMING PARADIGM AND  
 CENTRAL CLAIMING PARADIGM .....................................................................90 
 
A. Peripheral Claiming  .................................................................................90 
B. Central Claiming  ......................................................................................91 
IV. CAN THE PERIPHERAL CLAIMING PARADIGM DELIVER?  
 IF NOT, HOW CAN WE CHANGE IT? ..................................................................92 
A. Peripheral Claiming is Yielding Insufficient Notice ..................................92 
B. Possible Alternatives and Advantages of  
 Relying on Definitional Accuracy ..............................................................99 
V. CONCLUSION  ................................................................................................103 
 
2
Cybaris®, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol2/iss1/5
[2:73 2011]              Note: Tiptoeing Through the Peripheral Minefield:  75 
Why Catering to Concepts of 
Notice is Misguided 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
―Imagine no possessions.  I wonder if you can.  No need for greed or hunger.  
A brotherhood of man.  Imagine all the people.  Sharing all the world.‖
1
  
While John Lennon‘s sentiment may be rousing to some, the simple truth is 
that property rights have been—and will continue to be—paramount in 
establishing a strong economy.
2
  In patent systems, property rights are granted by 
interpreting one or more claims.
3
  The way in which a claim is interpreted 
implicates competing notions of definitional accuracy and notice.
4
  The U.S. 
system focuses on notice at the expense of definitional accuracy.
5
  This article 
argues that such a sacrifice is misplaced and that the U.S. system has poor 
definitional accuracy (relative to other patent systems) and does not realize the 
promise of improved notice.
6
   
A. Why Property Systems Work   
In order for any property system—including an intellectual property system—
to meet its stated objectives, the system must avoid creating property rights whose 
validity is uncertain; avoid creating property rights whose investment costs are 
prohibitive; avoid creating property rights that are not publically accessible; and 
avoid creating property rights of which the boundaries are not clearly defined or 
are otherwise unpredictable.
7
  As will be articulated in further detail, the way in 
which the U.S. achieves notices at the expense of definitional accuracy does not 




Coming into possession of a patent confers certain property rights on the 
holder.
9
  Generally speaking, these property rights extend only as far as can be 
                                                          
1
 JOHN LENNON, Imagine, on IMAGINE (Apple Records 1971). 
2
 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 31 (2008) (―Property 
rights are the cornerstone of a market economy.‖). 
3
 See infra notes 13–16 and accompanying text. 
4
 See infra Part III.   
5
 See infra Part III. 
6
 See infra Part IV. 
7
 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 7 (generalizing these criteria to all property systems, 
not just intellectual property systems and providing examples where violations of these tenants 
resulted in adverse affects on particular property systems).   
8
 See infra Parts II–IV. 
9
 These rights primarily include the right to exclude others from using, making, or selling the 
subject matter embodied in the patent.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154 (a)(1), 271 (2006). 
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supported by the patent document itself.
10
  To facilitate this function, a patent is 
comprised of a number of elements including a specification.
11
  The specification 
must contain one or more claims and a written description.
12
  
Claims define the scope of protection afforded to the inventor under the 
issuance of the patent.
13
  A claim is a single sentence that includes ―three distinct 
subparts: preamble, transitional phrase, and body, in that order.‖
14
  The scope of a 
patent claim is measured by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) during the 
process by which an inventor procures the patent,
15
 and by the courts when 
determining whether a patent has been infringed.
16
  There are two primary 
interpretation paradigms in use today: central claim interpretation and peripheral 
claim interpretation.
17
  Peripheral claiming endeavors to use the claim language to 
draw a periphery around the property right.
18
  In essence, the patentee asks for a 
particular scope of patent protection by the language used in the claim.
19
  
Conversely, central claiming uses the claim language to refer back to the written 
description.
20
  The written description is used to define the scope of protection by 
providing protection for the embodiments disclosed and their equivalents.
21
  
                                                          
10
 Claims are invalid if not supported by the specification.  See, e.g., Consol. Elec. Light Co., 
v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (―If the description be so vague and uncertain 
that no one can tell, except by independent experiments, how to construct the patented device, the 
patent is void.‖).  
11
 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(2), 112 (2006). 
12
 Id. § 112, ¶¶ 1–2. 
13
 See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).  ―It has long been 
understood that a patent must describe the exact scope of an invention and its manufacture to 
‗secure to [the patentee] all to which he is entitled, [and] to apprise the public of what is still open 
to them.‘‖  Id. at 373 (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891)). 
14
 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY‘S WALKER ON PATENTS § 4:96 (4th ed. 2010).  For a number of 
example claims, see id. n.3. 
15
 See, e.g., SHELDON W. HALPERN, CRAIG ALLEN NARD & KENNETH L. PORT, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, 
TRADEMARK 256–58 (2d ed. 2007).  This process has traditionally been referred to as patent 
prosecution.  See, e.g., id. at 257.  
16
 See, e.g., id. at 279.  Courts generally hear a Markman Hearing, which is essentially a mini-
trial, to determine the meaning of the claims.  See, e.g., Frank M. Gasparo, Note & Comment, 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and its Procedural Shock Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 
J.L. & POL‘Y 723, 724–25 (1997). 
17
 ANTHONY W. DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS 12 (2d ed. 1971) (―There are two general methods 
of defining an invention—central definition and peripheral definition.‖).  The differences between 
the two interpretive methods are more thoroughly explored infra Part III. 
18
 See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 14, §§ 4:2, 4:8, 4:92. 
19




 See, e.g., id. § 4:8. 
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Because economic justifications are central to determining whether the patent 
system is meeting its intended objectives,
22
 this article focuses on components of 
claim interpretation that impact the economic justification of the patent system: 
definitional accuracy and notice.
23
  Herein, definitional accuracy is defined as the 
ability of a patent to clearly define the contribution of the inventor to the state of 
the art.
24
  Notice is defined as the ability of a patent to clearly define the metes 
and bounds of the property right conferred by the patent.
25
  Under this conception 
of definitional accuracy and notice, the U.S. system sacrifices too much in the 




B. Policy Justifications of the U.S. Patent System 
This sacrifice creates real questions as to whether the U.S. system properly 
meets its stated policy justifications.  The manner in which a claim is interpreted 
implicates one or more policy justifications over others.
27
  There are many 
articulated justifications for the existence of the U.S. patent system.
28
  However, 
these stated justifications may be more appropriately partitioned into natural 
rights justifications and economic justifications.  ―[T]here are essentially two 
broad justifications for patenting.  One is based on the natural right of the 
inventor. . . . The other [is an economic] view . . . that patenting is a discretionary 
                                                          
22
 See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
23
 See infra Part III.  Conceptions of whether a particular mechanism provides a greater 
reward to the inventor are largely ignored.  The likelihood that broader patent rights will provide 
larger rewards for the inventor is merely a secondary purpose.  See supra infra notes 24–31 and 
accompanying text.  Furthermore, it is not always clear whether the reward received by the 
inventor is commensurate with their inventive effort.  See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing 
definitional accuracy and how inventors are not always given a property right over their 
contribution to the art). 
24
 This is consistent with how others have defined this term.  See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 14, 
§ 4:9. 
25
 This is also consistent with how others have defined this term.  See, e.g., id. 
26
 See infra Parts III–IV. 
27
 See infra Part III. 
28
 See, e.g., Georgia E. Kralovic, Comment, The Principle of Fair Notice: Is It Prudent 
Guidance For the Future of Patent Law?, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 89, 89 (1999) (presenting the idea that 
―The United States patent system serves three important objectives: (1) to reward inventors for 
their efforts in developing innovative technology; (2) to encourage these inventors and others to 
continue to advance technology; and (3) to disclose to the public the scope of the invention so that 
the public is put on notice of that which is no longer in the public domain.‖).  These and other 
justifications can be applied to virtually any intellectual property system, although this article 
focuses primarily on the United States patent system.  See, e.g., HALPERN, NARD, & PORT, supra 
note 15, at 1.  
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act of the sovereign, acting on behalf of the public.‖
29
  The natural rights 
justifications focus on Lockean concepts of owning one‘s labor.
30
   
In general, these natural rights justifications encounter what some consider 
fatal problems.
31
  For example, natural rights should last in perpetuity or until the 
inventor‘s death, which is contrasted by a limited period of exclusivity granted by 
our patent system.
32
 Additionally, Lockean Labor Theory cannot be used to 
justify control over third parties.
33
   
The economic justifications, on the other hand, essentially amount to the idea 
that the government offers a patent system in order to increase societal wealth.
34
  
These economic justifications focus on balancing the social costs of administering 
the patent system with the social benefits received.
35
  Social costs are incurred by 
the public due to a distortion in the free market
36
 and in administration of the 
patent system.
37
  Generally, social benefits ripen from incentivizing the inventive 
process.
38
     
Part II describes an historical framework from which the United States first 
required claims, moved to peripheral claiming, and then allowed a specific form 
of central claiming.  Part II also discusses the role of the PTO and recent judicial 
decisions that have impacted how claims are interpreted.  Part III defines the 
                                                          
29
 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 1:26 (footnote omitted). 
30
 See, e.g., id. § 1:28.  
31
 Id. (―[T]he attempt to justify the patent system of this country through natural law runs into 
problems that are probably insurmountable.‖).  As such, framing discussions of the patent system 
using natural rights justifications appears to be a misguided endeavor.  See id.  In other words, one 
should focus on the economic justifications and not the natural rights justifications because 
―[r]ewarding inventors for their discoveries is a secondary purpose, and merely a means to achieve 
[the] stated end.‖  Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework For Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. 
REV. 323, 330 (2010); see also Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330–
31 (1945); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942)). 
32
 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (―[The patent] grant shall be for a term beginning on the 
date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the 
patent was filed in the United States . . . .‖). 
33
 See 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 1:28. 
34
 Id. § 1:29 (―The sovereign exercises this discretion according to its calculation of how best 
to increase society‘s welfare.  Typically, this welfare is viewed in economic terms, with the goal 
of the patent system said to be the maximization of society‘s aggregate wealth.‖). 
35
 Id. (―[T]hese views all involve consideration of the costs and benefits of granting patent 
rights.‖). 
36
 This distortion generally increases the costs of goods because the supply is suboptimal to 
meet demand.  See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 1:32.  A supply shortage necessitates that some 
portion of society is denied the benefit of the invention while it is under exclusive control of the 
inventor.  Id.  
37
 See id. § 1:30. 
38
 Namely, by promoting advancement in the overall technical sophistication of society. 
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benefits and drawbacks of the peripheral claiming paradigm and the central 
claiming paradigm using the definitional accuracy and notice objectives.  Part IV 
analyzes the peripheral claiming paradigm to determine if improved notice under 
the doctrine has been realized.  In so doing, this article concludes that peripheral 
claiming‘s promise of improved notice has not been realized and discusses what 
can be done to ameliorate its deficiencies.  
II. HISTORY 
This section discusses the historical evolution of the patent system vis-à-vis 
legislative acts adopted by Congress and how the PTO and the courts have been 
instrumental in sculpting the system we have today. 
A. Historical Beginning of the Claim in the Patent Document: An Effort to 
Quantify the Social Costs and Social Benefits of the Patent System. 
The United States Constitution endows the Congress with the power to 
―promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . .‖
39
  The first act of 
Congress to utilize this power was the Patent Act of 1790.
40
  The Patent Act of 
1790 created a review board that would substantively review patent 
applications.
41
  The Patent Act of 1790 did not require an invention to be defined 
in scope by one or more claims.
42
  During this time, the scope of the invention 
was determined centrally.
43
  The Patent Act of 1790 was also unique in that it 
attempted to define novelty worldwide.
44
  
Apparently, substantive evaluation by a select few was viewed as unworkable 
because soon thereafter, the patent act of 1790 was replaced by the patent act of 
                                                          
39
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
40
 Ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (repealed 1793).  See also Edward C. Walterscheid, 
Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 445, 448 (1997) 
[hereinafter Charting a Novel Course].  ―No copy specifically identified as H.R. 10 has been 
found, and what is known about it comes from indirect sources.‖  Id. at 462–63. 
41
 See Charting a Novel Course, supra note 40, at 519–20 (noting that the review board 
comprised ―the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the Department of War, and the Attorney 
General.‖).  See also EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS 3 
(1998) [hereinafter TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS]. 
42
 See Charles W. Adams, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a Derelict on the Waters of 
Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1113, 1116–18 (2006) (discussing the history of patent legislation 
from the Patent Act of 1790 through the early twentieth century). 
43
 Id. at 1117 (―In the absence of claims, the invention was defined using a central definition 
system.‖). 
44
 TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 41, at 14 (―The United States, 
however, would become the first country wherein novelty, or more correctly the type of 
anticipation that precludes novelty and hence patentability, would be predicated on what was 
known or used not merely within its borders but anywhere in the world.‖). 
7
Bender: Tiptoeing Through the Peripheral Minefield: Why Catering to Conce
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
[2:73 2011] CYBARIS
®
, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW 80 
1793.
45
  The Patent Act of 1793 abolished subjective examination and instead 
opted for a basic registration system.
46
  Another interesting addition to the Patent 
Act of 1793 was the idea of trebling of damages for patent infringement.
47
   
The Patent Act of 1793 generally remained operative until 1836.
48
  The Patent 
Act of 1836
49
 initiated sweeping changes to the patent system.
50
  The Act of 1836 
created a system that is similar to the one we have today.  For example, the Act 
instituted a Patent Office,
51
 reinstituted substantive examination,
52
 and laid the 
groundwork for the willful infringement doctrine by making the trebling of 
damages discretionary.
53
  The Patent Act of 1836 is also the first patent act that 
statutorily required the use of a claim.
54
  However, it appears that these claims 
                                                          
45
 Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (repealed 1836).  See also TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF 
USEFUL ARTS, supra note 41, at 15–16.  This seems to indicate that the social costs of subjective 
evaluation by a select few were not justified by the social benefits of the approach. 
46
 TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 41, at 15–16. 
47
 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318, 322.  See also Matthew D. Powers & 
Steven C. Carlson, The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement, 51 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 53, 67–68 (2001) (discussing the statutory history of the treble damages 
provision). 
48
 TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 41, at 421–32; Powers & 
Carlson, supra note 47, at 67–68.  Some scholarship exhibits surprise that the 1793 Act remained 
in effect for as long as it did.  See TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 41, at 
421 (―[P]erhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Act of 1793 is that it remained the law of the 
land for as long as it did.‖).    
49
 Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (repealed 1870). 
50
 TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 41, at 427 (―[The Act of 1836] 
repealed all existing patent laws including the Act of 1793 and replaced them with a patent law 
that was new in major respects.‖). 
51
 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §1, 5 Stat. 117, 117. 
52
 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, §7, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20.  See also TO PROMOTE THE 
PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 41, at 427 (―[T]he Patent Office was now required to 
conduct an examination to determine if certain substantive conditions for patentability were 
met.‖). 
53
 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (―[I]t shall be in the power of the 
Court to render judgment for any sum above the amount found by such verdict as the actual 
damages sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three times the amount thereof, according to the 
circumstances of the case . . . .‖).  The Supreme Court first interpreted this language in Seymour v. 
McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488 (1853).  See Powers & Carlson, supra note 47, at 68 (―The Court 
stated that the mandatory treble damages provision in the 1793 Act resulted in ‗great injustice,‘ 
because ‗[t]he defendant who acted in ignorance or good faith, claiming under a junior patent, was 
made liable to the same penalty with the wanton and malicious pirate.‘‖ (quoting Seymour, 57 
U.S. at 488)).  
54
 Adams, supra note 42, at 1117 (―The earliest statutory reference to claims appeared in the 
Patent Act of 1836, which provided that an inventor ‗shall particularly specify and point out the 
part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.‘‖ (quoting 
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119)). 
8
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were not used peripherally to determine the scope of the invention, but instead 
were used centrally to point out specific aspects of the invention.
55
  
Between the passage of the Patent Act of 1836, and that of the Patent Act of 
1952, the Patent Act of 1870 was enacted.
56
  However, the more interesting 
historical events of that time were not statutory in nature.  Prior to the 1870s, 
central claim expressions dominated the claiming landscape.
57
  Then, in the 1870s 
and 1880s, practitioners began using the modern peripheral claiming system.
58
  
While an explicit rationale for the transition seems to be lost to the ravages of 
time,
59
 it seems fair to assume that practitioners of the era were drawn to 
peripheral claiming‘s putative benefits.
60
  While peripheral claiming created a 
different collection of issues,
61
 it has been the preferred method of claiming for at 
least the last hundred years.
62
  
In 1952, the Patent Act was again revisited, at which time the means-plus-
function claiming was statutorily enabled.
63
  The means-plus-function claim 
construction has been interpreted to be more limited in scope than that of a claim 
using more general claiming language.
64
  Another way to look at means-plus-
                                                          
55
 See Adams, supra note 42, at 1117–18 (―While the general practice after 1836 was to 
include one or more claims after the description of the invention, they merely served to highlight 
what the inventor considered were the most significant aspects on the invention.  Infringement was 
not determined on the basis of the claims; instead, the trier of fact determined infringement by 
comparing the plaintiff‘s and defendant‘s products to each other.‖ (citations omitted)).  
56
 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952). 
57
 See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Who’s Afraid of Functional Claims? Reforming the Patent Law’s § 
112, ¶ 6 Jurisprudence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 244–57 (1999) 
(discussing the use of functional claiming and its application as a central claiming expression). See 
also 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:83 (―central claiming . . . prevailed prior to the 1870s‖). 
58
 See Adams, supra note 42, at 1118 (―After 1870, patent claims practice moved from the 
central definition system to the modern peripheral definition system . . . .‖). 
59
 See 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:3 (―The precise mechanisms by which this change occurred 
are not recorded, and at least several competing theories have been advanced.‖). 
60
 See id. 
61
 These can best be summarized as an attempt to restrain the near unlimited scope that can be 
achieved by the plain meaning of peripherally drawn claims.  See, e.g., O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 
62, 113 (1853) (holding the broadest claim invalid because there was insufficient enablement); see 
also Consol. Elec. Light Co., v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (―If the 
description be so vague and uncertain that no one can tell, except by independent experiments, 
how to construct the patented device, the patent is void.‖). 
62
 See 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:3. 
63
 See Act of July 19, 1952, §112, 66 Stat. 792, 798–99 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 
112 (2006)). 
64
 See Rudolph P. Hofmann, Jr. & Edward P. Heller, The Rosetta Stone for the Doctrines of 
Means-Plus-Function Patent Claims, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 231 (1997) 
(―Thus, while general claims enjoy a scope as broad as their unambiguous claim language permits, 
means-plus-function claims are given a different, more limited treatment.‖). 
9
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function claiming is as ―a vestigial form of central claiming.‖
65
  One would think 
that because there was a departure from central claiming in the 1880s, the use of 
means-plus-function claiming would be minimal; however, means-plus-function 
claiming remains widely used.
66
 
B. The Patent and Trademark Office 
The Patent Act of 1836 essentially established the PTO.
67
  Since its inception, 
the PTO has generally acted as a gateway to the courts.
68
  While the complicated 
interplay between administrative agencies and the courts is beyond the scope of 
this article, decisions by the PTO regarding claim interpretation have been 
incorporated into the U.S. patent system by holdings of various courts.
69
   
A particular example is how the PTO dealt with the concept of ―back-firing.‖ 
Back-firing was a central claiming mechanism whereby language such as 
―substantially as herein described‖
70
 was used to encompass more than what was 
explicitly recited in the written description, while still reading limitations into the 
claim from the written description using central claiming principles.
71
  In 1902, 
the Commissioner of Patents determined that back-firing expressions could not 
sustain patentability.
72
  Shortly thereafter, courts held that back-firing expressions 
                                                          
65
 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:7. 
66
 See id. § 4:83 (―means expressions are used . . . extensively in United States patent 
practice‖). 
67
 The Patent Act of 1836 created the Patent Office, the precursor to the Patent and Trademark 
Office.  See TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 41, at 1. 
68
 As a general matter, without an assigned patent, a putative plaintiff lacks the standing to sue 
for patent infringement.  See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006) (―A patentee shall have remedy by civil 
action for infringement of his patent.‖).  One well-recognized exception is that exclusive licensees 
have standing to sue for injuries sustained.  See, e.g., Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI 
Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing the differences 
between exclusive licenses and bare licenses, and the implications on the respective licensee‘s 
standing to sue). 
69
 See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:3 (―[T]he Patent Office rendered decisions [during the 
1860s and 1870s] that can be taken as signaling an intention to use only peripheral claim 
interpretation during the examination of patent applications.‖ (citations omitted)).  See also infra 
notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
70
 Another common phrase was ―substantially as described.‖  See Adams, supra note 42, at 
1118. 
71
 See, e.g., Janis, supra note 57, at 252. 
72
 See Adams, supra note 42, at 1118 (―In 1902, the Commissioner of Patents ruled that 
[back-firing expressions were] vague, indefinite, and in violation of the requirement to particularly 
point out and distinctly claim the invention.‖). 
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had no legal effect.
73




However, it is important to note that the PTO‘s decisions do not always strike 
a proper balance between social costs and social benefits.  In general, many of the 
PTO‘s decisions directly relate to their function as an issuer of patents; i.e., 
decisions are predicated on ensuring that patents issued by the PTO are valid.
75
  
The concept of a constructive reduction to practice is one such example.  Under 
section 102, the person who first conceives of the invention and reduces it to 
practice has inventive priority over all others.
76
  However, this creates problems 
because the PTO does not inquire as to whether an invention has been reduced to 
practice, and therefore, many patents are issued that are not actually reduced to 
practice before filing.
77
  ―Arguably, therefore, the patents should be invalid. This 
argument is so theoretically attractive, in fact, that it has appeared repeatedly in 
litigated cases for over a century.‖
78
    
In an effort to ensure that issued patents are valid, the PTO adopted the rule 
that ―the act of filing a patent application is equivalent to reducing the invention 
to practice through actual construction and testing, provided that the application 
both claims the invention at issue and contains a disclosure sufficient to support 
the claim under rules that relate to adequate disclosure.‖
79
  In determining that 
only a filed patent can constitute a constructive reduction to practice, the PTO‘s 
decision went only so far as to ensure that patents issued by the PTO were valid.
80
  
Typically, balancing the social costs of patenting has been left to the courts.
81
 
C. The Courts 
The decisions rendered by the courts seem to point to a general erosion of a 
patent claim‘s ability to provide notice.  This section briefly presents a few of the 
most current cases regarding claim interpretation and infringement, Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc.,
82
 Vitronics Corp., v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
83
 Warner-
                                                          
73
 See, e.g., Nat‘l Tube Co. v. Mark, 216 F. 507, 515 (6th Cir. 1914). 
74
 Adams, supra note 42, at 1118. 
75
 See 2 MOY, supra note 14, § 8:93 (―The doctrine of constructive reduction to practice 
extends no farther than is necessary to rescue the PTO from the embarrassment of routinely 
issuing invalid patents.‖) 
76
 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006). 
77




 Id. § 8:91. 
80
 Id. § 8:92. 
81
 See generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) 
(discussing why general policy considerations favor the preemption of state-granted patent rights). 
82
 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
84
 and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co.
85
  This section also touches on the articulation of 
the doctrine of indefiniteness espoused in Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v. 
United States.
86
   
1. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. 
Markman revolved around whether claim construction was a matter of law 
for the courts or a matter of fact for the fact finder.
87
  Reviewing claim 
construction as a matter of law was not a new concept.
88
  However, Markman’s 
holding that claim construction was a matter of law
89
 still did violence to the 
concept of notice.  For example, Markman provided no guidance as to how a 
court should interpret the claim language.
90
  Without an articulated manner in 




                                                                                                                                                              
83
 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
84
 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
85
 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
86
 265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
87
 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372.  See generally Gasparo, supra note 16, at 735–40 
(discussing the Supreme Court‘s decision and the issue before the Court). 
88
 Gasparo, supra note 16, at 733–34 (―Interestingly, prior to Markman, for centuries, many 
courts had treated claim construction as a matter of law.  Conversely, some courts decided that 
there were factual issues within a patent‘s claims, so that claim construction was a matter for the 
jury.‖ (citations omitted)). 
89
 Markman, 517 U.S. at 372 (―We hold that the construction of a patent, including terms of 
art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.‖). 
90
 See Gasparo, supra note 16, at 740 (―Despite the holding in Markman that judges must 
construe a patent‘s claims, nowhere in Justice Souter‘s opinion, nor in the concurring and 
dissenting opinion of the Federal Circuit in Markman, was there any suggestions as to how.‖ 
(citations omitted)). 
91
 Id. at 740–41 (―As a result of the Federal Circuit‘s silence in Markman, and the lack of any 
guidance by the subsequent Supreme Court decision, district courts have formulated three options 
available to a trial judge for when claims can be interpreted.  First, a judge can construe a patent‘s 
claims on the paper record.  Second, a judge can hold a separate bench trial, which has come to be 
known as a Markman Hearing.  Third, a judge can wait until all the evidence has been presented at 
a trial, and prior to instructing a jury, before taking a hiatus to construe a patent‘s claims.‖ 
(citations omitted)). 
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2. Vitronics Corp., v. Conceptronic, Inc. 
Essentially, Vitronics Corp. begins where Markman ends.  The issue before 
the court was interpreting the meaning of a claim.
92
  The court in Vitronics Corp. 
details a multi-step approach for analyzing intrinsic evidence: 
First, we look to the words of the claims themselves, both asserted 
and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention. . . . 
[S]econd, it is always necessary to review the specification to 
determine whether the inventor has used any terms in a manner 
inconsistent with their ordinary meaning. . . .  Third, the court may 
also consider the prosecution history of the patent, if in evidence.
93
 
As the analysis of intrinsic evidence related to the use of extrinsic evidence, 
the court noted, ―[i]n most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone 
will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term.  In such circumstances, it is 
improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.‖
94
  Some have suggested that this implies 
that it is impermissible to rely on extrinsic evidence for claim construction,
95
 but 
the Federal Circuit has dispelled that contention.
96
  In light of Markman and 
Vitronics Corp., courts view issues of claim construction as a matter of law, first 
using intrinsic evidence.  While the Federal Circuit has on numerous occasions 
given reason why extrinsic evidence should be used sparingly,
97
 extrinsic 
evidence ―may be considered if the court deems it helpful in determining ‗the true 
meaning of language used in the patent claims.‘‖
98
   
3. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. dealt with the doctrine of equivalents.
99
  Typically, the 
doctrine of equivalents is invoked when ―accused and patented devices [are] 
                                                          
92
 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (―Claim 
construction is the only step in the infringement analysis at issue in this appeal‖). 
93
 Id. (citations omitted). 
94
 Id. at 1583. 
95
 See Peter S. Menell, Matthew D. Powers, & Steven C. Carlson, Patent Claim Construction: 
A Modern Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 725 (2010) 
(―Litigants continue to argue that it is improper to consider extrinsic evidence in Markman rulings, 
citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc.‖). 
96
 See id. (―However, the Federal Circuit disavowed any such interpretation of Vitronics, and 
Phillips puts to rest any suggestion it is wrong to consider extrinsic evidence.‖). 
97
 See, e.g., Philips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing a number 
of reasons why extrinsic evidence is disfavored).  
98
 Id. at 1318 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir.  
1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). 
99
 See Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997). 
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conceptually similar.‖
100
  This is contrasted with literal infringement, where 
―accused device correspond[s] to the claim language exactly.‖
101
  While it is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss the Warner-Jenkins Co. decision in 
great depth,
102
 the case is germane to the discussion regarding the concept of 
notice.  In particular, the Court noted ―[i]nsofar as the question under the doctrine 
of equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed element, 
the proper time for evaluating equivalency—and thus the knowledge of 
interchangeability between elements—is at the time of infringement, not at the 
time the patent was issued.‖
103
  
                                                          
100




 For a comprehensive discussion on the Warner-Jenkinson Co. decision, see Donald S. 
Chisum, The Scope of Protection For Patents After the Supreme Court’s Warner-Jenkinson 
decision: The Fair Protection—Certainty Conundrum,  14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 1 (1998). 
103
 Warner-Jenkinson Co., 520 U.S. at 37. 
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The ―time of infringement‖ rubric raises a number of questions.
104
  At least 
one commentator argues that these questions are irrelevant, but they have applied 
those questions to the question of patentability, and not necessarily incorporated 
those questions into the concept of notice.
105
  Viewed from the notice perspective, 
the Warner-Jenkinson Co. decision is problematic.
106
  The general problems with 
the doctrine of equivalents as it relates to the concept of notice will be described 
in more detail below.
107
 
4. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co. 
The Court in Festo Corp. further refined the doctrine of equivalents.  The 
Court in Festo Corp. first discussed the inherent ambiguities present in using 
language to define the scope of the invention: 
[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture the 
essence of a thing in a patent application. . . . The language in the 
patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or 
describe with complete precision the range of its novelty.  If 
patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value 
would be greatly diminished.
108
 
                                                          
104
 Chisum, supra note 102, at 34 (―[Q]uestions could be asked as to what is meant by the 
‗time of infringement,‘ especially when the infringement occurs over a lengthy period of time 
during which the state of the art evolves.  Is it the date when the accused product or process was 
designed?  When the first infringing act occurred?  Can the same product or process infringe at 
one point in time but not at another because of changing knowledge in the art as to how an alleged 
equivalent element functions and hence whether it is equivalent?‖).  
105
 See id. at 34–36. 
106
 See Adams, supra note 42, at 1133–34 (―As a result of the Court‘s ruling, the scope of 
patent protection under the doctrine of equivalents will expand continually as more knowledge is 
acquired over time.  Not only is the scope of patent protection freed from the limitation of what 
the patentee did claim, it is freed from the limits of what the patentee could have claimed.  Thus, 
under the Warner-Jenkinson decision, the doctrine of equivalents extends patent protection to 
after-arising equivalents, that is, variations of an invention that were not known at the time of the 
issuance of the patent but would be considered equivalents from the perspective of a skilled 
practitioner at the time of infringement.‖). 
107
 See infra notes 113–117 and accompanying text. 
108
 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).  The 
Court went on to state that: 
Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat 
the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of 
copying. For this reason, the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, 
may conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the most efficient rule. 
The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all 
equivalents to the claims described. 
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The Court also discussed how the prosecution history
109
 can play a role in 
determining the scope of equivalents: 
The narrowing amendment may demonstrate what the claim is not; 
but it may still fail to capture precisely what the claim is. There is 
no reason why a narrowing amendment should be deemed to 
relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment 
and beyond a fair interpretation of what was surrendered.
110
 
The Court then articulated when the patentee could overcome when the doctrine 
of equivalents is barred under prosecution history estoppel:  
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the 
application; the rationale underlying the amendment may bear no 
more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in question; or 
there may be some other reason suggesting that the patentee could 








There are a number of potential problems with the doctrine of equivalents, 
generally.
113
  For the purposes of notice, one issue is how putative infringers and 
patent holders dispense with claims arising under the doctrine of equivalents.  
While claim construction is a matter of law,
114
 literal infringement and the 
application of the doctrine of equivalents are reserved for the jury.
115
  This can be 
problematic for both sides of an infringement cause of action because the doctrine 
of equivalents cannot generally be disposed of with a motion for summary 
                                                                                                                                                              
Id. at 731–32. 
109
 A prosecution history is the series of Office Actions provided by the PTO pointing out 
deficiencies in the patent application and their respective responses by the inventor or their agent.  
See T. Whitley Chandler, Prosecution History Estoppel, The Doctrine of Equivalents, and the 
Scope of Patents, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 466 (2000). 
110
 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 738.  The Court also noted, ―[n]or is there any call to foreclose 
claims of equivalence for aspects of the invention that have only a peripheral relation to the reason 
the amendment was submitted.‖  Id. 
111
 Id. at 740–41. 
112
 Id. at 741. 
113
 See Adams, supra note 42, at 1136–56 (articulating a number of problems with Festo 
Corp. specifically and the doctrine of equivalents more generally, including the argument that 
aspects of the Festo Corp. decision are counter to the statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
first paragraph). 
114
 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
115
 See Adams, supra note 42, at 1149. 
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judgment.
116
  This implicates notice, in part because it is difficult for a business to 
anticipate what will be swept into the claim language as an equivalent.
117
 
5. Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v. United States 
Exxon Research & Engineering Co.
118
 dealt with how a court should handle 
potentially ambiguous terms in a claim and how that impacts a claim‘s validity.  
In Exxon Research & Engineering Co., the court construed claims that included 
the language ―for a period sufficient‖ and ―to increase substantially.‖
119
  In 
reversing the Court of Federal Claims, the Federal Circuit stated: 
We have not insisted that claims be plain on their face in order to 
avoid condemnation for indefiniteness; rather, what we have asked 
is that the claims be amenable to construction, however difficult 
that task may be. If a claim is insolubly ambiguous, and no 
narrowing construction can properly be adopted, we have held the 
claim indefinite. If the meaning of the claim is discernible, even 
though the task may be formidable and the conclusion may be one 
over which reasonable persons will disagree, we have held the 




Some have argued that such an approach is damaging to the patent system.
121
  
Furthermore, while some ambiguity in the claim would not be per se harmful to 
the concept of notice, the harm to notice is exacerbated by the unpredictable 
nature of claim interpretation.
122
 
                                                          
116
 Id. (―[I]n the absence of a narrowing amendment, summary judgment is generally not 
available with respect to claims for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.‖). 
117
 Id. at 1151 (―[The application of the doctrine of equivalents] can only result in jury 
confusion and uncertainty as well as anxiety for a patentee‘s competitors who cannot tell whether 
a variation of an invention that is outside the literal scope of the claims is lawful or infringing.‖); 
see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 61 (―The doctrine of equivalents corrodes the notice 
function of patents and increases the risk of inadvertent infringement.‖). 
118
 265 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
119
 Id. at 1374. 
120
 Id. at 1375. 
121
 See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 57 (―[P]atent applicants sometimes game the 
system by drafting ambiguous patent claims that be read narrowly during examination, such that 
they avoid a novelty rejection, and broadly during litigation, which supports a finding of 
infringement.‖). 
122
 See infra notes 147–51 and accompanying text; see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, 
at 58 (―[D]istrict court judges do a poor job of predicting Federal Circuit claim interpretation.  
Certainly, it follows that lawyers will have difficulty counseling potential infringers how an 
ambiguous claim term will be interpreted.‖). 
17
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Notice is predicated on the ability for the public to comprehend the metes and 
bounds of the patent right.
123
  However, when the scope of the claim is not 
defined until interpreted by the courts,
124
 the language of the claim can itself be 
ambiguous,
125
 and claims can incorporate technology not known at the time of the 
invention,
126
 the metes and bounds of the patent right is anything but clearly 
defined. 
III. THE PERIPHERAL CLAIMING PARADIGM AND CENTRAL CLAIMING 
PARADIGM 
This section briefly touches on the differences of the two claiming paradigms 
and gives a concrete example of how the same claim language may yield a 
different scope of protection under each.  
A. Peripheral Claiming 
Traditionally, the peripheral claiming paradigm has been attributed with poor 
definitional accuracy, but better notice when compared with its central claiming 
counterpart.
127
  This is because of how the claims are interpreted; a central claim 
derives its scope from the written description and is tightly coupled with the 
disclosure, while a peripheral claim derives its scope from the plain meaning of 
the claim and may not be tightly coupled to what is disclosed in the written 
description.
128
  That being said, the definitional accuracy in the mechanical arts is 
substantially worse than the definitional accuracy in the chemical arts.
129
  
This difference can generally be traced to how the courts interpret mechanical 
arts claims in light of the specification and how they interpret chemical arts 
claims in light of the specification.  Namely, the broadest chemical arts claims 
must be supported by a representative number of embodiments in the written 
                                                          
123
 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 8 (―An efficient property system notifies non-owners 
of property boundaries.‖). 
124
 See supra notes 89–98 and accompanying text.   
125
 See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.   
126
 See supra notes 103, 116–17 and accompanying text.   
127
 See 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:4 (―[W]hile peripheral claiming holds out the promise of 
improved notice, this improvement comes at the cost of a significant decrease in definitional 
accuracy.  This accuracy exists inherently in central claims, whose scope is defined by the patent 
disclosure directly.  In peripheral claiming, on the other hand, the scope of the claim and the 
contents of the specification are essentially divorced.‖). 
128
 Id.  See also supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
129
 See, e.g., 2 MOY, supra note 14, § 7:26 (―[I]n the [mechanical] arts it is essentially 
impossible to associate particular technological configurations uniquely with a single word 
description.  As a necessary consequence, then, it is impossible to limit a peripherally drawn claim 
to only the disclosed embodiment.  Instead, a patent system that issues peripherally drawn claims 
in the mechanical and electrical arts will always issue coverage that is generic in some respects.‖). 
18
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description,
130
 while the broadest mechanical arts claims need only be supported 
by a single representative embodiment in the written description.
131
  
Some scholars have argued that the disclosed innovation is incapable of 
teaching the public because the definitional accuracy is generally so poor in 
peripherally claimed patents.
132
   Without a sufficient disclosure of the inventive 
concepts, i.e., a teaching, one cannot come into intellectual possession of the 
invention.  This is counter to the underlying policy regarding the enablement 
requirement.
133
     
B. Central Claiming 
Traditionally, the central claiming paradigm has been attributed with poor 
notice, but better definitional accuracy when compared with its peripheral 
claiming counterpart.
134
  It seems that the United States, for various reasons, 
abandoned the central claiming paradigm around the 1880s.
135
  The primary 
difference between the two paradigms can be highlighted using a simple 
example.
136
   
                                                          
130
 See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:65 (―In essence, United States patent law will grant 
the inventor rights over a genus in [the chemical arts] if he or she has supplied a disclosure that 
teaches, at least by implication, how to implement all the included species.‖); see also Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997), reh’g denied, en banc 
suggestion declined (Oct. 24, 1997) (requiring a ―representative number of species‖). 
131
 See, e.g., Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (―If 
an invention pertains to an art where the results are predictable, e.g., mechanical as opposed to 
chemical arts, a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment . . . .‖). 
132
 See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 
621 (2010) (―[W]hen the [patent] document publishes, it can serve as a form of technical 
literature.  Because patents can, at times, communicate knowledge as well as, or better than, other 
information sources, patents could become a competitive source of technical information. 
Presently, however, patents are rarely viewed in this manner.  There are several reasons for this, 
including the lack of a working example requirement and the pervasive use of ambiguous or 
opaque language.‖); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 561 (2009) 
(―[An] indicator of the patent literature‘s irrelevance to further technological research is the 
extremely limited citation of patents in the non-patent scientific literature: only 1.5% of U.S. 
patents have been cited in the scientific literature—of which only 1.7% are citing U.S. patents—
and 73% of these patents are cited merely once.‖).   
133
 See 2 MOY, supra note 14, § 7:31 (―[T]he enablement requirement . . . asks whether the 
disclosure would have communicated enough knowledge to give intellectual possession of the 
invention to a typical artisan.‖). 
134
 See 1 MOY, supra note 14, §§ 4:3, 4:9.  See also supra note 127. 
135
 See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
136
 This example may be overly simplistic, but it draws into sharp contrast the differences 
between the two paradigms. 
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Assume that a claim is directed to a fastener.  Under the peripheral claiming 
paradigm, this language could be used as the basis for patent protection over 
many different types of fasteners, including screws, staples, nails, brads, and the 
like.
137
  Under the central claiming approach, only those embodiments disclosed 
would be protected, along with reasonable alternatives.
138
   
For example, if only a screw was disclosed, other substantially different types 
of fasteners such as staples and brads may fall outside the scope of protection.
139
  
However, most types of screws, such as wood screws, masonry screws, and the 
like, would fall within the scope of protection.
140
   
IV. CAN THE PERIPHERAL CLAIMING PARADIGM DELIVER?  
IF NOT, HOW CAN WE CHANGE IT? 
Recall that the definition of notice is the ability of a patent to define clearly 
the metes and bounds of the property right conferred by the patent.
141
  If the 
primary benefit of the peripheral claiming paradigm over the central claiming 
paradigm is improved notice, we are paying too great a societal cost for a de 
minimis benefit.
142
  This section discusses why peripheral claiming is not 
delivering and some of the potential benefits in a change of course.  
A. Peripheral Claiming is Yielding Insufficient Notice  
There are a number of cases that would seem to indicate that notice in the 
patent system is not being realized.
143
  The mere fact that corporations with 
massive research and development budgets could be found to infringe a patent 
would indicate that these organizations are either willful infringers
144
 or 
                                                          
137
 See generally 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:8–9; 2 id. § 7:24 (providing a detailed discussion 
of this example). 
138






 See supra Part I. 
142
 See infra Part IV.A. 
143
 See, e.g., Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) ―[T]he E-Data dispute arose because hundreds of parties, including some very large 
companies, ignored, did not see, or misunderstood the boundaries created by the patent in 
question.‖  BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 8.  See also Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  Kodak took ―great care‖ to invent around Polaroid‘s patents, but 
was still slapped with damages totaling approximately $900 million.  BESSEN & MEURER, supra 
note 2, at 48.  
144
 Certainly, the story surrounding Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 
(Fed. Cir. 1986), would seem to counsel against the assumption that these organizations are 
always willful infringers.  If anything, this case, and others, indicates that these companies are 
spending large amounts of time and resources to determine the scope of a patent, yet are 
20
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peripheral claiming as currently implemented by the courts does not provide 
adequate notice.
145
  And while central claiming does not provide improved notice 
over a peripherally drawn claim, it provides better definitional accuracy with at 
worst a de minimis reduction in overall notice.  
This can be understood by reviewing the current procedures and doctrinal 
decisions handed down by the Supreme Court—namely the Markman, Warner-
Jenkinson Co., and Festo Corp. cases.
146
  First, based on Markman and its 
progeny, holders of a patent and putative patent infringers are not notified of the 
scope of the litigated claim until the Markman hearing.
147
  Under this approach, a 
first scope of protection is defined during patent prosecution vis-à-vis the filings 
of the inventor and communications with the PTO.
148
  Once a patent is asserted 
against a putative infringer, the court, construing the claims in light of intrinsic 
evidence, determines a second scope of protection.
149
   
If the court is not satisfied by the informing nature of the intrinsic evidence, it 
is within the court‘s discretion to look at extrinsic evidence to determine the scope 
of the patent claims.
150
  Under this approach, not only does the putative infringer 
not have notice until the court determines the patent scope, but the putative 
infringer does not have notice regarding what the court eventually relies on to 
arrive at that determination.
151
  This is contrasted with a centrally drawn claim, 
                                                                                                                                                              
nonetheless being ensnared by their claims.  See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 50–51 
(discussing the great pains that Kodak went to determining the scope of the state of art over the 
course of some seven years, including reviewing sixty-seven written opinions from a leading 
patent expert).   
145
 One reason for this is that organizations are remaining purposefully ignorant to the 
existence of patented technology.  See infra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.  However, this 
was not the case in Eastman Kodak Co., where the company was anything but purposefully 
ignorant.  See supra notes 143–44.   
146
 See generally supra notes 87–117 and accompanying text. 
147
 See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.  In other words, a putative infringer is not 
provided actual notice of the claim scope until they spend the money necessary to arrive at the 
Markman hearing. 
148
 Here, the PTO looks at the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim language.  See, 
e.g., In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (―[D]uring examination proceedings, 
claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.‖). 
149
 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (―In most 
situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed 
claim term. In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.‖). 
150
 Id.   
151
 The court in Vitronics Corp. did give courts guidance regarding how the intrinsic evidence 
should be applied.  See id. at 1583.  However, whether there are any remaining ambiguities may 
still be subjective according to the background and experiences of the trial judge.  Furthermore, 
the skill of the trial attorneys and the scope of the intrinsic evidence may play a role.  For example, 
―computer readable medium‖ typically is directed to a hard drive or other storage medium.  With 
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where the scope of protection is defined by what is disclosed and equivalents 
thereof.
152
  That is, in the central claiming paradigm, putative infringers lack 
notice regarding what a court considers to be an equivalent, but not what a court 
considers in determining the literal bounds of the claim.  
 Second, even if there is no literal infringement of the claim language, 
under Warner-Jenkinson Co. and Festo Corp., there may be infringement because 
one or more of the elements of the allegedly infringing method or article of 
manufacture is equivalent to a respective claim element.  Problematically, the 
patent at issue does not give a putative infringer notice as to what may be 
considered equivalent by the court.
153
  In essence, the expansion of progress in the 
art is determinative of equivalency, and not the teaching of the patent document.  
In other words, what provides notice is not the patent document, but the artisan‘s 
understanding of the art.  In general, this understanding cannot be established by a 
comprehensive reading of related or even relevant patents.
154
   
Interestingly, the main reason why central claiming provides poor notice is its 
reliance on equivalency.
155
  If one compares the doctrine of equivalents and 
central claiming‘s use of equivalency, they are essentially the same.  The doctrine 
of equivalents dictates that a claim can be infringed by subject matter falling 
within the scope of the peripheral claim and equivalents thereof.
156
  Equivalency 
under central claiming, on the other hand, specifies that a central claim can be 
infringed when subject matter falls within the scope of the embodiments disclosed 
in the written description and equivalents thereof.
157
  In other words, central 
claiming and peripheral claiming in the U.S. have substantially the same 
                                                                                                                                                              
the advancement of devices capable of reading and interpreting electrical signals originating from 
the brain, categorizing the brain as a ―computer readable medium‖ is not an entirely specious 
argument.  Depending on how the patent specification defines those terms and how well the 
attorneys advocate for one position over another, a judge may well indulge extrinsic evidence for a 
fully informed decision. 
152
 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
153
 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997) (―[i]nsofar 
as the question under the doctrine of equivalents is whether an accused element is equivalent to a 
claimed element, the proper time for evaluating equivalency—and thus knowledge of 
interchangeability between elements—is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was 
issued.‖ (emphasis added)).   
154
 See supra notes 127–33 and accompanying text.  The manner in which a claim element 
may be expanded by the application of the doctrine of equivalents seems to be at odds with 
previous conceptions of the doctrine.  See DELLER, supra note 17, at 18 (―[T]he application of the 
doctrine of equivalents may render the claim either co-extensive with its terms or narrower.  It 
never broadens the claim.‖ (emphasis added)). 
155
 See 1 MOY, supra note 14, §§ 4:3, 4:4, 4:9. 
156
 See 4 id. § 13:10; see also supra Part II.C.iii. 
157
 See 1 MOY, supra note 14, §§ 4:2, 4:8, 4:92. 
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reduction of notice; both systems rely on forms of equivalency, which effectively 
expands the scope of the patent right in a way that obfuscates the bounds of that 
right.  
To exacerbate the issue, as Markman makes clear, claim construction is a 
matter of law reviewed de novo by an appellate court.
158
  If the patent holder or 
putative infringer disagrees with the claim construction as interpreted by the 
district court, there is a strong possibility that the appellate court will find the 
claim interpretation incorrect.
159
  More importantly, the rate of reversal has 
increased,
160
 meaning that notice is an increasingly ephemeral and illusory 
concept.  
In sum, notice as implemented by the U.S. system, is an inadequate barometer 
for a claiming paradigm.  In order, however, to justify why notice is so important, 
the concept of notice in the patent setting is commonly linked to the traditional 
property boundary in the real property setting.
161
  This analogy is appealing 
because we want to define a patent boundary in such a way that one can avoid 
trespassing on the patent of another vis-à-vis notice of the existence of that 
boundary.
162
  However, this analogy does not take into consideration the shifting 
and discretionary nature of claim interpretation,
163
 or the grave consequences of a 
trespass in a patent setting.
164
  
In addition, the idea that one could simply look at a patent claim to determine 
the metes and bounds of the property right—analogous to determining the metes 
and bounds of a property right by inspection of a deed—seems inconsistent with 
                                                          
158
 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978‒79 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 
517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
159
 Approximately thirty-five percent of the time, appellate courts find an error in the way the 
claim was construed below.  See David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rate, 43 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1073, 1095 (2010) (―From 1991 through 2008, 28.5 percent of appeals from district courts 
involving claim construction were reversed, vacated, or remanded.  In another 6.6 percent of the 
cases, the Federal Circuit found a claim construction error by the district court but nonetheless 
affirmed.‖). 
160
 See id. (―[T]he overall reversal rate clearly increased after [Markman].‖). 
161
 See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917) 
(―The scope of every patent is limited to the invention described in the claims contained in it, read 
in the light of the specification.  These so mark where the progress claimed by the patent begins 
and where it ends that they have been aptly likened to the description in a deed, which sets the 
bounds to the grant which it contains.‖). 
162
 See, e.g., Am. Roll Gold Leaf Co. v. W. H. Coe Mfg. Co., 212 F. 720, 723 (1st Cir. 1914) 
(―The public have a right to rely upon the language of the claims in determining how far the 
patentee‘s rights go.‖).  
163
 See generally supra Part II.C. 
164
 See supra note 143.  There are a vast number of organizations within the United States 
where a $900 million dollar verdict could potentially bankrupt them. 
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the law.  If one were put on actual notice of the existence of the patent right—for 
example, by reading the claimed language—one could be found to have willfully 
infringed the patent.
165
  Patents generally, and claims more specifically, cannot 
put anyone on notice if the conventional wisdom is that their reading should be 
avoided as a first, and sometimes dispositive, step to avoid trebling of damages.
166
   
While the standard for willful infringement has since been modified,
167
 the 
fact that one can come under the umbrella of an award for treble damages for 
being put on actual notice
168
 illustrates the irreconcilable difficulty of catering 
claim interpretation methodology to notice because it can be too costly for the 
public to read claims to determine the scope of the patent.  In other words, 
―numerous legal and institutional features of the patent system undermine the 
notice function of property: the boundaries created by patents are hidden, unclear, 
or too costly to determine.‖
169
   
Some have suggested that these numerous institutional features need to be 
confronted if they plague the concept of notice.
170
  That implies, however, that 
notice is something that can be objectively determined in all circumstances and 
established before an infringement lawsuit is initiated against an alleged infringer.  
                                                          
165
 Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 
1983), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (―Where . . . a 
potential infringer has actual notice of another‘s patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to 
exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing.  Such an affirmative duty includes, 
inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of 
any possible infringing activity.‖ (citations omitted)).  
166
 Barring only a few mitigating circumstances, one cannot be put on actual notice of the 
existence of an invention if they remain purposefully ignorant of its existence.  Without the 
infringer reading a patent or being in possession of a clearly marked patented device, a claimant 
has a very difficult hurdle to ―show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted 
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.‖  
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d at 1371.   
167
 Id. at 1371 (―Accordingly, to establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear 
and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its 
actions constituted infringement of a valid patent.‖). 
168
 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  See also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
169
 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 2, at 147. 
170
 There are a number of works that explore this concept.  See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, 
supra note 2, at ch. 11 (suggesting that the Federal Circuit give more deference to the PTO and 
lower courts when interpreting claims, giving teeth to the concept of indefiniteness by invalidating 
any claim with more than one plausible interpretation, and suggesting reform to good-faith 
infringement). 
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The notice provided in the patent setting, though, is not driven by a universal 
concept of absolute delineation from the property boundary
171
—as in the property 
setting—but is instead driven by a general risk-reward calculus that goes into 
most, if not all, business decisions.
172
  For example, if an individual tortuously 
trespasses on the property of another in a real property setting they may be 
enjoined from that activity.
173
  But generally speaking, the injunction does not 
have the same economic impact that enjoining a patent infringer may yield.  There 
are very few situations where enjoining a trespasser of real property would lead to 
the demise of the putative trespasser.  
One such situation may be when a particular piece of real property is 
circumscribed by other pieces of real property not owned by the putative 
trespasser.  However, in such situations the courts—as a matter of equity—likely 
look to create an easement on the basis of necessity or prior use, among other 
rationales.
174
  In the patent setting, the severe amount of damage that can be 
incurred by a business found guilty of infringing can cause a mortal wound to the 
fiscal health of the business entity.  Yet, there is no similar notion of an easement 
on the basis of necessity in the patent realm.  
For example, if a corporation spends vast amounts of resources inadvertently 
developing an infringing product or method of manufacture, it may be unable to 
recapitalize or otherwise continue to exist when it is enjoined from making or 
selling the product or using the method of manufacture.
175
  As such, the basic 
trespasser analogy is inapposite.  
A more informing analogy would construct an image of the land being littered 
with land mines, where both the potential trespasser and the landowner are aware 
of the hazard‘s existence.
176
  Yet, neither the trespasser nor the owner could be 
                                                          
171
 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 
(2002) (―[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent 
application.‖ (emphasis added)). 
172
 See Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Risk Management: 
Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies, 48 J. FIN. 1629, 1629 (1993) 
(―[R]ecent surveys find that risk management is ranked by financial executives as one of their 
most important objectives.‖).   
173
 See generally 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions §§ 103, 106 (2010). 
174
 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 2.15 (2000) (stating that 
servitudes (i.e., easements) may be created in favor of a particular piece of land for the purposes of 
the reasonable enjoyment of the land). 
175
 Even where an injunction is not granted, the damages that an infringer is required to pay 
may cause a mortal wound. 
176
 Here, it is assumed that the potential trespasser is aware that the owner is protected by a 
patent, but there are numerous situations where a potential trespasser may not even realize they are 
trespassing.  Again, it is considered a sound business practice for employees of organizations not 
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sure of where the minefield is located because neither has the tools to identify the 
field‘s periphery.  The location(s) of these hazards are the trespasser and owner‘s 
respective best guess—which may or may not be accurate—and likely diverges 
between them.   
Using this minefield analogy, the concept of notice changes from a more 
objective standard
177
 to a basic concept of risk adversity, which is more subjective 
for each trespasser.  Here, how close the trespasser gets to the periphery of the 
property depends solely on how much risk he or she can tolerate. This may be 
predicated on a number of factors, including the resources available to the 
business entity,
178
 the sophistication of the business entity,
179
 and other market 
conditions.  For example, if the trespasser lacks deep pockets, it might stay 
completely out of sight range from the particular parcel of land.
180
  If another 
more risk-adverse entity had reason to believe the risk-reward ratio was in its 
favor, then it might approach or even enter the parcel of land.
181
   
Regardless of the business entity‘s subjective belief—and unlike the 
trespasser analogy—the business entity could not determine if it had hit a land 
mine until after it had approached the parcel of land.
182
  Notice, while an 
important aspect of the economic justifications,
183
 needs to be tethered to 
something more substantial than words on a page.  The English language is 
                                                                                                                                                              
to read patents in order to be protected from claims of willful infringement, but this process does 
not shield oneself from infringement, generally.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (stating that 
an infringement claim can be asserted against anyone whom ―without authority makes, uses, 
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention.‖ (emphasis added)). 
177
 For example, the objective nature of defining the boundaries of real property based on 
survey information. 
178
 Businesses with deeper pockets and more tolerability to risk may be more willing to risk 
infringement than others because a court‘s adverse judgment may not be sufficiently crippling in 
comparison to the possible financial gain.  Conversely, businesses with deeper pockets and less 
tolerability to risk may be less willing to risk infringement, knowing that their deep pockets bring 
them within the cross-hairs of patent holders. 
179
 Businesses that are more routinely involved with intellectual property disputes may be at 
an advantage compared to businesses that are not because they may be better able to predict 
whether the conduct is infringing. 
180
 This may be because the entity cannot absorb the litigation costs of defending a lawsuit, or 
even the costs associated with reaching a settlement. 
181
 This may be because the entity has strong reason to believe it is actually a non-infringer, or 
that the patent in question is invalid under a variety of theories, including being anticipated or 
obvious in view of the prior art.   
182
 In other words, once the claim scope has been determined by a Markman hearing.  See 
supra note 16. 
183
 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 1:29; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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inherently ambiguous.
184
  Each business must engage in a risk-reward type 
analysis to determine if the research and development costs are warranted, 
notwithstanding the putative notice provided by the claim language of an 
identified patent under the peripheral claiming paradigm.  And again, this 
assumes that an organization has determined it is worth the risk to be put on 




Therefore, sacrificing definitional accuracy for the concept of bolstering 
notice is misguided.  Notice in its current incarnation cannot be used to guide an 
understanding of the metes and bounds of a patent because those metes and 
bounds are only determined well into an infringement litigation, and even then, an 
interpretation decided upon by the district court is reversed in approximately 
thirty-five percent of cases.
186
  Instead, the U.S. claiming paradigm should focus 
on something that we can and should exert substantially more control: definitional 
accuracy.  
B. Possible Alternatives and Advantages of Relying on Definitional Accuracy 
In light of the fact that the peripheral claiming paradigm is not providing the 
quality of notice that distinguishes peripheral claiming over its central claiming 
counterpart,
187
 it is urged that other alternatives to the peripheral claiming 
paradigm be explored.  In particular, there are perhaps some non-obvious ways to 
improve the notice present in claims as currently interpreted.   
For example, one interesting endeavor is to look to how other professions 
create the notice that is necessary to their respective professions.  One good 
example is the software engineering profession generally, and the development of 
critical systems specifically.
188
  For instance, the National Aeronautical and Space 
                                                          
184
 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 
(2002) (―[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent 
application.‖ (emphasis added)). 
185
 See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text.  At least a large subset of situations will 
lead a business entity to forego the reading of patents.  The opportunity to weight the costs and 
benefits of innovation in a particular technological area under control of a patent holder is likely 
not worth the risk of being exposed to treble damages.  
186
 See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
187
 See supra Part IV.A. 
188
 See Critical Systems Labs, Inc., What are Critical Systems?, 
http://www.criticalsystemslabs.com/pgs/What.html (last visited May 4, 2011) (―Critical systems 
are systems in which defects could have a dramatic impact on human life, the environment or 
significant assets.‖).  Using this definition of a critical system, it is paramount that the software 
requirements (articulating exactly what the software must do) and the software design 
(implementation specifics stating exactly how the software meets its stated requirements) notify  
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Administration (NASA) requires that software requirements can only be 
designated using the word ―shall.‖
189
  There are other limitations that have been 
adopted by practitioners in the field, including adopting a glossary of terms that 
specifies standard definitions of terms used in the industry.
190
  This ensures that 
software developers are using a set of pre-defined terms that specify the metes 
and bounds of the software functionality.  Such an approach, however, likely does 
not work for the patent system
191
 because allowing an inventor to act as his own 
lexicographer allows the inventor to describe something so novel that there are no 
current words to describe the invention.
192
  It still, however, reinforces the point 
that when things more paramount than monetary loss are at stake, such as human 
lives, government-funded entities have developed novel approaches for providing 
notice to those that practice in the art.
193
     
Certainly, the most obvious alternative is to embrace a more central 
interpretation of the claim language.  For example, the U.S. patent system already 
embraces means-plus-function claiming in the mechanical arts.
194
  In the chemical 
arts, to the extent that genus (or broadest) claims are used, claim scope is already 
limited by the nature of what is disclosed.
195
  In essence, if all mechanical arts 
patents were impliedly analyzed under the mean-plus-function rubric,
196
 the U.S. 
patent system would substantially close the gap between definitional accuracy in 
                                                                                                                                                              
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as to how the software system 
safeguards human life, the environment, or significant assets.  
189
 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Software Safety Standard § 1.4.1 
(July 8, 2004), available at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/doctree/871913B.pdf. 
190
 See, e.g., IEEE Standards Board, IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering 
Terminology (Sept. 28, 1990), available at http://www.idi.ntnu.no/grupper/su/publ/ese/ieee-se-
glossary-610.12-1990.pdf. 
191
 Among other reasons, there is likely far too much momentum for anyone to rationally 
consider this as an appropriate option, let alone considerations of patent invalidity of already 
issued patents. 
192
 See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 14, §§ 4:36, 4:38–9.    
193
 Like the notice of a patent, the notice present in a requirements document and a 
corresponding design document are presented only through pictures and ambiguous words.  It 
seems NASA has determined one way, and perhaps the only way, to provide sufficient notice 
when relying on words is to remove much of the ambiguities by a combination of limiting the 
words that can be used and the definitions associated with those words.  
194
 See Hofmann & Heller, supra note 64, at 231; 1 MOY, supra note 14, §§ 4:7, 4:83. 
195
 See 1 MOY, supra note 14, § 4:65; Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 
1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987).  In essence, genus claims in the chemical arts are already interpreted 
centrally because in order for the broadest claims to be valid, the specification must disclose a 
representative number of species, which inherently captures reasonable equivalents of the 
disclosed species.   
196
 For example, by limiting the claim scope to what is disclosed, instead of granting broad 
rights based solely on a single disclosed embodiment and broad peripheral claim language. 
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the peripheral claiming paradigm and definitional accuracy in the central claiming 
paradigm while yielding little or no reduction of overall notice.
197
  
There are a number of advantages to focusing on the definitional accuracy of a 
patent over its ability to give notice.  First, improving the definitional accuracy of 
a patent will likely necessitate an improvement in the teaching quality of the 
specification.  This is because if we define the scope of the patent based on what 
is disclosed in the patent, it incentivizes inventors to increase both the scope and 
quality of what is disclosed.  Moreover, if a patent is viewed as being a statement 
of the art,
198
 this approach is appealing.  
Improving definitional accuracy may in fact lead to better notice for a subset 
of society: people of ordinary skill in the art.  If we assume that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art is versed in the art, then it follows that a person skilled in 
the art would be able to ascertain the metes and bounds of the property right by 
subtracting their understanding of the state of the art from the information 
contained in the specification.
199
  
Second, some inter-disciplinary harmonization can be brought to the U.S. 
patent system.  The broadest claims in the mechanical arts and the broadest claims 
in the chemical arts are supported by the specification in different ways.
200
  
Namely, a single embodiment must be disclosed in the mechanical art to support a 
broad claim, while a representative number of embodiments must be disclosed in 
the chemical art to support a broad claim.
201
  If we always apply a means-plus-
function mechanism to constrain the broadest mechanical art claims, inventors 
and practitioners would be incentivized to disclose a larger number of 
embodiments in order to carve out the broadest protection possible.   
                                                          
197
 This is not meant to imply that such an undertaking is a mere a trivial change.  Anytime 
you fundamentally change how a patent claim is interpreted, the validity of virtually every issued 
patent construed under the prior interpretation paradigm is brought into question.  However, the 
longer the system goes unchanged, the more painful the transition, particularly since the rate of 
patenting is increasing over time.  See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Number of Utility 
Patent Applications Filed in the United States, By Country of Origin, Calendar Years 1965 to 
Present tbl.1, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/appl_yr.htm (last visited May 4, 
2011) (illustrating an increase from approximately 100,000 filed applications in the 1960s and 
1970s to an average of approximately 450,000 filed applications over the last several years). 
198
 Many people currently do not view a patent as being a statement of the art.  See Seymore, 
supra note 132, at 621.  But that does not mean that they do not believe that it is a worthwhile 
endeavor.  Furthermore, it is not impossible to envision a scenario where the state of the art for 
many areas of applied technology is defined by what is taught in those patent specifications.   
199
 Improved definitional accuracy does nothing to those that remain purposefully ignorant of 
the contents in issued patents.  Little can be done, however, to improve notice when the documents 
that are designed to give notice are not being read. 
200
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In so doing, a court in its interpretive capacity would analyze mechanical art 
claims and chemical art claims in substantially the same way.  Specifically, a 
representative number of mechanical art embodiments would need to be disclosed 
in order to support those broad claims because the representative number of 
embodiments and their reasonable alternatives would create the same scope of 
patent protection in the mechanical arts as a current peripherally drawn claim in 
the chemical arts.  
Third, the exploitation of the patent system can be frustrated by those non-
practicing entities, pejoratively known as patent trolls.  Typically, as a non-
practicing business entity, a patent troll does not produce a product, and procures 
a patent by purchasing the issued patent from another.  Some may argue that the 
exploitation characterization is unfair because we live in a free market.  However, 
because a patent troll does not add anything to the technical sophistication of 
society and their primary purpose is to extract royalties or settlements from 
others, patent trolls stifle innovation and unnecessarily burden society by 
increasing costs of goods.
202
  Non-practicing entities can utilize the fact that a 
single embodiment in the mechanical arts can give rise to a broad genus-type 
claim with damaging effects.   
If patent claims were interpreted more centrally, patent trolling may be 
affected for a number of reasons.
203
  Where patent trolls are asserting rights to 
patents procured by other non-practicing entities, the patents likely lose at least 
some of their claim scope in a central claiming paradigm.  The narrowing of the 
scope of the patent is attributable to a limited written description and does not 
give rise to a genus-type claim by teaching a single representative embodiment.
204
  
This also allows those practicing entities to more easily design around the 
described embodiments.  In other words, the number of patents with broad scopes 
                                                          
202
 Defending against patent suits may merely be a ―cost of doing business.‖  See, e.g., 
Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Let’s Build a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. 
J.L. & Tech. 367, 376‒77 (2005).  But the costs of doing business are invariably passed on to the 
consumer as higher costs for those goods. 
203
 This, however, does not mean to suggest that all patent trolling would disappear in a 
central claiming system.  There are other aspects of the U.S. law that make trolling more viable, 
such as trebling of damages and the infrequency of courts awarding attorney fees to the prevailing 
party.  See, e.g., Duncan Bucknell, European Patent Troll Boom? – I Think Not, THINK IP 
STRATEGY (Jan. 9, 2008), http://www.thinkipstrategy.com/ipthinktank/240/european-patent-troll-
boom-i-think-not/. 
204
 As a general matter, it seems reasonable that a non-practicing entity does not have 
sufficient insight to provide enough embodiments to ensnare a large number of practicing entities 
with a single patent. 
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Unfortunately, a simple transition to interpreting claims through the means-
plus-function lens gets us only so far.  There are a number of jurisprudential 
issues that would also need to be addressed.
206
  Furthermore, any change to how a 
claim is interpreted must be weighed cautiously; such a change has numerous 
complications on previously issued patents.
207
  However, a move towards 
interpreting claims more centrally provides benefits that should at least be 
considered.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Patents are economic instruments.  As such, to legitimize their existence, the 
social benefit of patents must outweigh their social cost.  Two ways in which the 
economic justification is measured is by the patent‘s ability to define the 
inventor‘s contribution to the art, and the patent‘s ability to inform third parties of 
the boundaries of the patent right.  
By selecting a peripheral claiming paradigm, the U.S. made a conscious 
decision to promote notice over definitional accuracy.  The U.S. patent system 
does a poor job of defining the inventor‘s contribution to the art.  Unfortunately, 
the current U.S. patent system also does a poor job of providing notice.  In fact, 
the U.S. patent system makes use of equivalents that are substantially similar in 
nature to equivalents that provide poor notice in the central claiming system.  
Furthermore, the courts have adopted various doctrines that under-cut a patent‘s 
notice-granting function.  More importantly, it is not entirely clear whether the 
inherently ambiguous nature of language can ever give rise to adequate notice, 
without more.  In essence, our decisions have created a system with the worst of 
both worlds.   
In light of the fact that language is inherently ambiguous and generally 
incapable of providing notice, the patent system should endeavor to promote the 
                                                          
205
 This would implicate the practice where a patent troll purchases a patent with a broad 
patent scope supported by only a limited number of embodiments.  The patent troll can use the 
broad claim language to leverage a settlement because the costs and uncertainty of litigation are so 
high for the accused infringer.   
206
 See, e.g., Janis, supra note 57, at 235‒36 (―[M]eans expressions are now subject to 
bewildering case law under which § 112, P 6 equivalents sometimes borrow characteristics from 
the doctrine of equivalents and sometimes do not.‖).   
207
 For example, both doctrines would need to be applied simultaneously, while issued patents 
under a former paradigm have a remaining patent term under the previous approach.  Simply put, 
it adds an additional layer of complication to patent litigation proceedings, which are already 
complex. 
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aspect of the economic justification it can control in definitional accuracy, and 
squeeze what little notice it can from such a system.  While not a perfect solution, 
this approach may at bottom lead to inter-disciplinary consistency regarding the 
interpretation of mechanical and chemical art claims.  Such an approach has 
numerous benefits and may provide some stabilization in an ever-changing area 
of the law.  
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